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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented growth in the global market for mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) both within countries and across borders. For emerging market economies
(EMEs) in particular, annual growth rates of the numbers of domestic and cross-border acqui-
sitions over 1990-2014 averaged about 23.5% and 14.5%, respectively. The growth of this global
marketplace, in which rm boundaries are redrawn and the ownership of resources is reallocated
among entities that face dierent degrees of nancial constraints, has not been continuous but
has typically varied with the occurrence of nancial crises.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows this phenomenon succinctly by plotting the number of domestic
and cross-border acquisitions in a sample of sixteen EMEs in each year from 1990-2014. It also
shows for each year the proportion of those transactions that occurred during a national nancial
crisis, a rough measure of the degree to which target rms were exposed to nancial shocks (the
variable labelled “crisis exposure”). Domestic acquisitions in EMEs slowed down during the 1997-
98 Asian Financial Crisis, only to experience a sharp increase in the later part of the sample, a
period which coincided with an absence of nancial crises in these countries. At the same time
we see that cross-border M&As in those countries, conducted mostly by rms from developed
markets, experienced a slowdown in relative terms during the Great Recession.
The prima facie evidence in Figure 1(a) suggesting that aggregate nancial conditions play
a signicant role in M&As has been corroborated by a large literature at least since the work of
Harford (2005). For EMEs in particular, while the surge in cross-border acquisitions — labelled
by Krugman (2000) as “re-sale FDI” — and the concurrent slowdown in domestic acquisitions
during nancial crises is well-documented (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin and
Yorulmazer, 2011b; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016), the underlying mechanisms by which
the domestic market for corporate control in EMEs reacts to aggregate nancial shocks remain
relatively understudied. Our paper lls this gap in the literature, and also addresses a more gen-
eral question: How do deep nancial crises shape the aggregate market for corporate control by
altering the set of target rms in need of liquidity, as well as impinging upon an acquiring rm’s
acquisition decision? In particular, motivated by a set of stylized facts described shortly and an
extensive prior literature that has shown ownership structure and its evolution over time as key
determinants of a number of rm level variables, we focus on two metrics that describe owner-
ship dynamics: the ownership structure chosen at the time of an acquisition and the subsequent
rate of divestiture.1 The main conclusion of our analysis is that, over the business cycle, nan-
1Examples include agency costs (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000), the degree of technology transfer (Hanousek and
Kočenda, 2017), value gains from an acquisition (Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) as well as their distribution be-
tween the target and acquirer shareholders (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001), and the incentives of the rm’s owners to
apply their technological or management resources (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001). By extension, the dynamics of the
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Figure 1: Trends in Ownership Patterns in Domestic and Cross-Border M&As
Notes: Figure displays: (a) the number of domestic and cross-border acquisitions; (b) average fraction acquired;
(c) the proportion of majority acquisitions; and (d) the proportion of full acquisitions, in domestic and cross-
border acquisitions in each year from 1990-2007 for the sample of EMEs in this paper. The variable measuring
crisis exposure is the percentage of rms in our sample in a particular year that are exposed to a national nancial
crisis. A national nancial crisis is dened as the occurrence of a banking crisis in a country in a particular
year. To identify systemic banking crises, we use the dataset constructed by Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2012),
covering the period 1970-2011. Since it only covers years up to 2011, we use “The Little Data Book on Financial
Development” from the World Bank which updates Laeven and Valencia’s dataset until 2013, and for 2014, we use
online searches of news reports to identify any banking crisis that occurred in a target country. From 2007 to 2014,
none of the 16 countries in our sample experienced a systemic banking crisis. Data on number of acquisitions
and fraction acquired are from the SDC Platinum database.
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cial constraints induce selection eects among acquirers that fundamentally inuence these two
metrics.
Our paper has two main contributions, one empirical and one theoretical. Empirically, we use
panel regressions and survival analysis techniques to show that both ownership structure cho-
sen and subsequent divestiture decisions react strongly to nancial crises in the case of domestic
M&As in emerging markets. As a preview of our later econometric results, panels (b)-(d) of Fig-
ure 1 show the average ownership patterns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions over time
using three dierent measures: (b) the average fraction acquired; (c) the proportion of majority
acquisitions; and (d) the proportion of full acquisitions, along with the crisis exposure indica-
tor. Figures 1(b)-1(d) show that while the ownership patterns in cross-border acquisitions are
relatively stable over time, for domestic acquisitions all three ownership metrics increase during
nancial crises. In fact, the average size of domestic stakes has a signicant positive correlation
with the exposure of rms to crises (around 0.77 across all three metrics; insignicant or negative
for cross-border acquisitions). In other words, domestic acquirers on average buy larger shares
of rms by acquiring majority or full stakes during nancial crises in their own countries; cross-
border stakes, starting from about the same averages pre-crisis, appear to increase as well, but
not by nearly as much. We show later that, on average, these crisis-time domestic acquisitions
are also signicantly more persistent, while this is not the case for cross-border acquisitions. Our
empirical contribution is to thoroughly document these facts about domestic and cross-border
acquisitions using a large panel of EME transactions. Our baseline estimates span the period
1990-2007, but we show that these patterns generalize to more recent years.
While neo-classical theories of merger waves in the tradition of Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2002) coupled with the empirical importance of aggregate liquidity (Harford, 2005) can recon-
cile the patterns in Figure 1(a), the empirical facts about ownership structure and its dynamics
that we document, taken together, present a puzzle for existing theories. In particular, why do
ownership patterns in domestic and cross-border M&As in EMEs, which tend to look similar in
normal times, diverge during times of aggregate nancial stress, and why do these eects per-
sist? Our second, novel contribution is to develop a simple analytical framework in which these
empirical patterns arise as a consequence of selection eects in the market for corporate con-
trol. In our model, both nancially constrained and nancially unconstrained acquirers engage
in M&As. All rms face borrowing constraints and some of them exit because they lack sucient
liquidity to operate. Other rms with more internal nancial resources and sucient borrowing
capacities can step in to buy their assets and thus prevent inecient liquidation. We label these
ownership structure of a rm exerts inuence on the evolution over time of a number of the above variables, as well
as being informative about the performance of the acquisition itself (Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1994; Lee and
Madhavan, 2010). It is therefore important to understand if, and how, nancial constraints and crises aect these
metrics.
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acquisitions “low-value” acquisitions because they take place even in the absence of synergies
— either technological or management-related — between the two rms. “High-value” acquisi-
tions, in contrast, involve those acquirer-target matches that are expected to be protable due
to synergies and independent of the target’s liquidity position. In this framework, we study the
implications of an aggregate negative nancial shock that tightens the borrowing constraints of
all rms in the economy, including potential domestic acquirers, but excluding potential foreign
acquirers.
The selection eect in response to the shock works as follows. From the targets’ side, an
aggregate negative nancial shock tends to raise the share of low-value, purely liquidity-driven
acquisitions in the total number of acquisitions because a larger proportion of potential target
rms face liquidity shortages. This channel drives the acquisition dynamics of foreign, nancially
unconstrained acquirers in our model. Similar mechanisms which operate through target rms’
nancial constraints have been studied before (see e.g. Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya, Shin
and Yorulmazer, 2011b; Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar, 2016). For domestic acquirers, who are
also subject to the nancial shock, our model highlights — in contrast to most of the theoretical
literature — a counteracting channel based on nancial frictions on the acquirer’s side: Since an
acquisition with higher expected gains from synergies relieves the joint, forward-looking bor-
rowing constraint of the acquirer-target pair, an aggregate nancial shock that tightens nancial
constraints for both acquiring and target rms results in only the highest synergy acquisitions
taking place. This leads to proportionally more acquisitions with real value gains (high-value
acquisitions) undertaken by domestic acquirers in times of aggregate nancial stress. This selec-
tion eect is our key theoretical result that helps explain the dierential evolution of ownership
patterns shown in Figure 1 (b)-(d), as well as divestiture rates.
First, to study the consequences of the selection eect on the share acquired, we augment our
model with a feature that is consistent with recent evidence from emerging market acquisitions:
Higher acquirer-target synergies are associated with larger, possibly controlling, or full stakes
acquired in target rms. This could be due to: the presence of intangible assets in a setting of
imperfect contract enforceability as in Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010); local inputs in the pro-
duction process as in Alquist et al. (2018); the mitigation of agency problems as in Acharya, Shin
and Yorulmazer (2011b); or simply due to the acquirer nding it easier to nance the acquisition
of a larger stake externally when synergies are expected to be higher.2 Coupled with the selec-
tion eect described earlier, the model predicts that domestic acquirers may — depending on the
strength of the selection eect — acquire larger stakes and be more likely to complete majority
2Due to the range of mechanisms suggested by the existing literature, providing micro-foundations for this aspect
of the model would be relatively straightforward. We make a deliberate choice not to do so since it would distract
from our focus on selection eects.
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or full acquisitions during nancial crises. In contrast, average shares acquired by foreign rms
are predicted to unambiguously decline.
Second, we further augment our model by an additional time period in which rms can resell
assets acquired in the initial, nancial-crisis period. We show that divestiture rates vary with
aggregate conditions for two reasons. First, when the matches between acquirers and targets are
low-value and liquidity-driven, they are reversed as soon as aggregate conditions improve. This
leads to larger “ipping” rates in the aftermath of nancial crises. This channel, which we call
“normal” ipping, has been emphasized so far in the literature by papers such as Acharya, Shin
and Yorulmazer (2011b) and Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016). The selection eect introduced
in our model changes this prediction for domestic acquirers that face nancial frictions: Acquirers
may also divest acquisitions when they themselves run into liquidity problems at future dates, a
channel that we call “forced” ipping. The selection eect implies that, among domestic acquirers,
only the most liquid rms will be able to undertake acquisitions during nancial crises. These
rms — assuming some persistence in rm liquidity across periods — are less likely to run into
liquidity problems at future dates and therefore be forced to divest. Thus, while ipping rates
should go up in the aftermath of nancial crises for foreign rms, they will increase less or might
even go down for domestic rms. Note that this channel, once again, works exclusively through
a selection eect of having relatively more liquid acquirers in the crisis cohort of constrained
acquirers, rather than any changes in rm-level ipping decisions. In fact, a distinctive feature
of our analysis is that the predicted aggregate eects on ownership structure and divestiture
follow entirely from selection induced by nancial constraints, and as such, are consistent with
unchanged behavior at the level of individual acquiring and target rms.
The empirical literature on EME acquisitions so far has mostly focused on identifying the ef-
fects of nancial frictions on the target side. In contrast, our interest lies in trying to distinguish
between these and the eects of acquirer-side frictions that are likely to be present in EMEs.
However, since an aggregate shock hits all rms, i.e., both acquirers and targets, a simple empir-
ical comparison between crisis- and normal-time acquisitions will in general confound the eect
of the crisis on acquirers with that of the eect of the crisis on targets. For example, the increase
in the size of stakes acquired by domestic acquirers during crises in Figures 1(b)-1(d) could be
driven by constrained acquiring rms seeking value-increasing majority stakes, or alternatively,
by constrained targets being sold at re-sale prices.
Hence, we explicitly adopt a dierence-in-dierence (DID) strategy in deriving predictions
from the model. Since foreign acquirers from developed markets face the same pool of target
rms as the domestic acquirers, yet do not face the eect of the crisis themselves, the dierential
eect of a nancial crisis on the ownership structures chosen by foreign versus domestic acquir-
ing rms, as well as any such double dierentials in divestiture rates, should be informative about
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the eect of the crisis on nancially constrained acquirers. This idea forms the basis of our main
theoretical predictions that: (i) the average share of equity acquired by constrained (domestic)
acquirers, as compared to unconstrained (foreign) acquirers should rise during nancial crises,
driven by an increase in majority or full acquisitions; and (ii) the divestiture rates for domestic
acquisitions should be relatively lower for the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions (in relation
to unconstrained foreign acquisitions). We implement the tests of these two hypothesis empir-
ically by comparing domestic and cross-border acquisitions across normal and crisis times, the
latter proxied by the plausibly exogenous occurrence of country-specic banking crises in EMEs.
Using developed market acquiring rms as a benchmark group is also motivated by a practical
consideration: While the argument above shows that a proper counterfactual is needed to isolate
the eects of acquirer-side constraints, there does not exist rm-level measures of nancial con-
straints for most of the EME acquirer or target rms in our sample, to the best of our knowledge.3
We use Thompson-Reuters SDC data for about 28,000 domestic and cross-border M&As in
sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control in emerging economies, using the pre-2008
sample of deals. The choice of sample period is guided by the need to have a nancially uncon-
strained group of foreign acquiring rms, which arguably is the case only for the period before
the Great Recession. However, we show that including data till 2014 does not change our results.
Using linear regressions and survival analysis techniques, we nd strong evidence in favor of
the two main predictions of the model. In particular, we nd that nancially constrained domes-
tic rms in the crisis-hit country acquire between 11-15% more ownership and are 15-18% more
likely to take majority stakes than their unconstrained foreign counterparts. Such ownership is
also more likely to be persistent: The survival rate of a domestic acquisition is between 19-24%
higher in the crisis cohort. These results are robust to a battery of checks that are listed later and
described in detail in an appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper builds on a recent literature on the nancial determinants of M&As, and in particular,
the ndings of Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) and Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016).
Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) show that when a key motivation of mergers is to
reallocate nancial resources from liquid to illiquid rms, pledgability issues may make it optimal
for high net worth rms to use discretionary credit lines to nance mergers. They also provide
empirical evidence in favor of such a role using a sample of domestic deals from the United
States. In contrast to Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth (2011) our theoretical focus is on the
3We acknowledge that large domestic rms in EMEs that face only very loose nancing constraints could also
be considered as unconstrained. However balance sheet data that would let us construct measures of nancial
constraints at the rm level are not available for the majority of domestic acquirer-target pairs in our sample.
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implications of selection eects on ownership patterns and their evolution, while our empirical
analysis uses domestic and cross-border deals from emerging markets. Our work also builds on
Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016), who look at so-called re-sale foreign direct investment in
a model where all target rms are credit constrained and all acquiring rms are unconstrained.4
In contrast to their paper, we develop a more general, yet tractable framework in which all rms,
acquirers or targets, may be nancially constrained, with important consequences. In addition,
our empirical emphasis is on the response of nancially constrained domestic acquiring rms,
and as such, we use foreign rms only as a benchmark group of unconstrained acquirers to isolate
the eects of acquirer versus target nancial constraints.5
In related work, Erel, Jang and Weisbach (2014) provide evidence that both foreign and domes-
tic acquisitions ease nancial frictions in target rms in a large sample of European acquisitions.
They nd that the investment levels of the target rms increase signicantly following an acqui-
sition. These ndings are consistent with our assumption that part of the gains from acquisitions
arise out of acquirers relaxing the borrowing constraints of the targets. Other recent papers such
as Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) and Wang and Wang (2015) also document similar nancial
gains from acquisitions. Turning to divestitures, while there are studies that focus on domestic
divestitures using US data (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Bergh,
1997), few papers have studied divestitures for the large volume of domestic M&As in emerging
markets, as we do.6
Our paper also contributes to the large theoretical literature on the drivers of M&As. Among
neo-classical theories, where optimal reallocation of capital across rms takes centre stage, promi-
nent examples include Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) where the highest value gains from mergers
result from matches between rms with the greatest disparity in Tobin’s Q; Rhodes-Kropf and
4In Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016), horizontal FDI is more productive and nancial crises lead to more
vertical FDI. Our approach in this paper is more general in that we do not assume any particular industry patterns
in the gains from acquisitions. Earlier research focused on the surge of foreign acquisitions and a concurrent decline
in domestic acquisitions and portfolio investment during EME crises (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b), and
the relationship between acquisition prices or probability and target liquidity (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005). Weitzel,
Kling and Gerritsen (2014) investigate the relationship between aggregate conditions, and the number of cross-border
transactions and asset prices in Europe and do not nd evidence in favor of signicant nancial frictions at work
during crises. Stoddard and Noy (2015), in a study using UNCTAD data on FDI volumes, also do not nd evidence
of re-sale FDI.
5There is a large — mainly empirical — literature exploring the role in acquisitions played by idiosyncratic acquirer
side liquidity and aggregate nancial conditions in the case of developed markets such as the United States. For
example, Harford (1999) empirically shows that cash-rich rms are more likely to attempt acquisitions, consistent
with an agency-based free cash ow argument. Harford (2005), investigating the US merger waves of the 1980s and
1990s, shows that while economic, regulatory and technological shocks are important for mergers, whether these
real shocks lead to a wave of mergers depends on measures of aggregate capital liquidity. In contrast to this literature,
our theoretical focus is on the acquisitions that do take place in an environment of low liquidity, i.e., selection eects,
while our empirical focus is on EMEs.
6Divestiture of cross-border acquisitions in EMEs has been studied by Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011b) and
Alquist, Mukherjee and Tesar (2016).
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Robinson (2008), who build and test a model of M&As where acquirers have higher Q than their
targets, but assortative matching leads to clustering of matches between rms of similar Q; and
recent contributions to this literature such as David (2017) which, similar to our paper, studies
the aggregate implications of domestic M&As, or Bircan (2017), who builds a dynamic model
of ownership structure based on incomplete information about target productivity. Other the-
ories have emphasized rational managers exploiting market misvaluation (Shleifer and Vishny,
2003); asymmetric information between bidders and targets about rm valuations (Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan, 2004); and managerial motives such as maintaining private benets or earn-
ing takeover premia (Gorton, Kahl and Rosen, 2009). Behavioral explanations, such as the eects
of stock price reference points on aggregate M&A activity, have also found empirical support
(Baker, Pan and Wurgler, 2012). In contrast to much of these two streams of literature, our paper
seeks to explain aggregate ownership structures and their dynamics, two features of M&As that
have not received as much prominence. In addition, the mechanism we explore to explain these
two features is a selection eect originating in nancial constraints, which is novel, to the best
of our knowledge.
Last but not least, the main mechanism in our paper is a selection eect based on rm-level
liquidity and the value gains from an acquisition. The latter can take many forms, including an
increase in productivity or wages in the acquired rm. Hence, our paper also speaks to a large
literature in macroeconomics — dating back to Schumpeter (1934) — that deals with the cleansing
eect of recessions, i.e. the process by which the least productive rms in the economy are forced
to exit during a recession, leading to aggregate eects on productivity.7 This literature, however,
has generally ignored the existence of the market for corporate control where distressed rms
may be acquired. In the concluding section we therefore discuss some implications of our results
for macroeconomic models that analyze the allocative eects of aggregate shocks.
2 A Model of Selection Eects in M&As
This section presents a simple model where nancially constrained rms can become targets of
acquisitions, and acquire other rms themselves if they have enough resources. This model is
based on simplied versions of the models studied in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Alquist,
Mukherjee and Tesar (2016) that we extend to include domestic, constrained acquirers.
7Recent papers in this literature that are related to ours include Osotimehin and Pappadà (2015), who look at how
credit constraints inuence the cleansing eect of recessions in a theoretical model of rm dynamics. In a similar
vein, our paper is also related to the literature that studies the reallocation of capital and other resources over the
business cycle (for example, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Cui, 2014). Obereld (2013) and Sandleris and Wright (2014)
provide evidence from the 1982 Chilean economic crisis and the 2001 Argentine crisis, respectively, of a decline in
the eciency of resource allocation within and across sectors during these crises.
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2.1 Two-Period Model Setup
The economy is populated by a continuum of rms. Firms in the baseline version of the model
last for two periods 0 and 1, and dier in their expected gross prots in period 1. Firms borrow in
period 0 to nance their production in period 1 and are able to pledge a certain fraction of their
expected gross prots to take out loans.
2.1.1 A Firm’s ProblemWithout Acquirers
To produce in period 1, all rms have to pay an upfront cost, b. Firms dier in their expected
period 1 (gross) prots, yi, which is i.i.d. across rms. Here, i indexes a particular rm and we
think of this rm as a potential target of an acquisition. We assume that yi > b for all i so that
all rms prefer production to non-production.
Firms’ initial endowment is 0, so that rms have to take out a loan to pay for the upfront cost
b. But the loan size cannot exceed a certain fraction τ of gross expected prots:8
b ≤ τyi. (2.1)
So τ ∈ (0; 1] measures the degree of credit frictions in the economy common to all rms.9 In
an economy without credit frictions, τ = 1. One can interpret τ as a measure of the maximum
‘debt-to-value’ ratio because b corresponds to a rm’s debt, and yi is a rm’s expected prots that
is available to pay o the debt. When we later discuss the eect of nancial crises on acquired
shares and divestiture rates, we model nancial crises through changes in τ .
If a rm lacks the capacity to pay for the upfront cost — that is if yi < bτ — it cannot produce
in the second period and the value of the rm is 0. These rms either immediately exit the
market or become targets of acquisitions. Market exit of this kind can be interpreted as inecient
liquidation of the rm since the rm would always prefer production to non-production. If a
rm’s expected prots are high enough, it can secure a loan and produce, which raises its value
by the expected prot net of the upfront costs, yi−b. These rms can stay in the market as stand-
alone entities, can be targets of acquisitions or can be acquirers themselves. The total value of a
8The form of the borrowing constraint captures a common prediction from models of limited contract enforce-
ment: The amount of credit is limited by the borrower’s expected prots. That is, the debt limit is forward-looking,
as e.g. in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) or Kehoe and Perri (2002). This forward-looking feature of the debt
limit is a crucial element of our model. Brooks and Dovis (2013) provide an empirical analysis of both forward- and
backward-looking credit frictions and nd evidence in favor of the forward-looking debt limit, which we adopt here.
9We choose a common τ across all rms to avoid introducing too many dimensions of heterogeneity because our
interest lies in aggregate gures such as the average acquired share across all rms. In earlier versions of this paper,
we considered dierences in a rm’s initial endowment and a rm’s borrowing constraint. Adding these dimensions
did not deliver any additional results and we therefore dropped them for the sake of a more parsimonious model.
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(potential target) rm i can then be summarized as
V tari =
0 if yi < bτyi − b if yi ≥ bτ . (2.2)
We now discuss the acquisition problem of potential acquirers, indexed by j.
2.1.2 Acquisition Decision and the Target’s Financial Position
Any pair of rms, denoted by i for a target and j for an acquirer, from the population described
above can potentially meet in the market for corporate control. We assume that i and j are
randomly matched in this market.10 As soon as they are matched, they draw an i.i.d. synergy
parameter net of acquisition costs, φi,j > 0 When a rm acquires a target, the target rm produces
next period and its expected net prots yi−b change by the factor φi,j .11 The value of an acquired
target rm i to an acquirer j is then
V acqi,j = φi,j(yi − b). (2.3)
An acquisition takes place under two conditions: i) its surplus is positive and ii) it is feasible.
Note here that while we do not explicitly model the process by which acquiring rms search for
targets, the matching process described is quite general in that it does not make any assumptions
about which rms (say based on size, productivity, Tobin’s Q etc.) end up in a match, except that
they draw a stochastic match quality parameter.
The surplus is the dierence between the value of the acquired rm after and before the
acquisition, i.e. V acqi,j − V tari :
Si,j =
Sconsi,j = φi,j(yi − b) if yi < bτSunconsi,j = (φi,j − 1)(yi − b) if yi ≥ bτ (2.4)
10We believe that many mergers are the result of (directed) search processes, as e.g. emphasized in Rhodes-Kropf
and Robinson (2008) among others. We chose, however, to keep dierences between constrained (domestic) rms
and unconstrained (foreign) rms to a minimum and therefore abstract from directed search. Our model emphasizes
the relevance of (economy-wide) borrowing constraints in shaping the distribution of acquisitions. Unless search
frictions are directly aected by changes in borrowing constraints, we believe that our model’s results are very
general and would still be present in a model with search frictions. In a similar vein, we also maintain the assumption
that all rms have access to the same set of target rms. We have experimented with restricting the pool of target
rms for foreign rms to only include large rms. Our results are not aected by this setup because they are based
on a dierence-in-dierence approach that cancels out these long-term dierences between acquirers.
11Note that φi,j can potentially be less than unity, which implies that acquisitions can be value-destroying, net of
the costs of acquiring (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005).
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Figure 2: Acquisitions
Notes: Shows the range of values for the target’s net prots, yi, that dene low- and high-value
acquisitions for acquisitions during normal and crisis periods. These ranges are φ−1
i,j
≤ yi ≤ bτ
for low-value and yi ≥ φ−1i,j for high-value acquisitions, with the subscript on the τ indicating
(n)ormal or (c)risis periods, and φ−1
i,j
being the inverse of the function dened in equation (2.5)
solved for yi.
Figure 2 shows the zero-surplus line S = 0 as a function of the synergy parameter φi,j and the
target rm’s expected prot yi. We denote the levels of φi,j that solve Scons = 0 and Suncons = 0
by φlo = 0 and φhi = 1. For φi,j > φhi, an acquisition always generates positive surplus because
the net benets from the resulting technological synergies are positive. This is true irrespective of
the target rm’s prots yi and the tightness of the borrowing constraint. These acquisitions occur
in the region above the line FF ′. We refer to them as “high-value” acquisitions. If the two rms
draw a synergy parameter φlo ≤ φi,j < φhi, technological synergies are not sucient to make
an acquisition protable. However, if the target rm is nancially constrained (i.e. its expected
prots are too low, yi < bτ ), so that the rms would be otherwise liquidated, an acquisition
generates additional benets from relaxing the borrowing constraint of the target and is therefore
protable. Firm pairings with φlo ≤ φi,j < φhi and yi < bτ (within the rectangular area ABCF )
are therefore protable, and are referred to as “low-value” acquisitions.
Firms in the region to the bottom left of ABC ′ are forced to exit because they cannot pay
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the xed cost of operating in period 1, yet their realized φi,j with the acquirer they have been
randomly paired with is too low for an acquisition to be protable. The rms to the right of
C ′CF ′ remain stand-alone entities or become acquirers themselves: Neither are they nancially
constrained, nor have they drawn a φi,j high enough (>1) for them to be acquired on the basis of
technological synergies alone.
2.1.3 Acquisition Decision and the Acquirer’s Financial Position
The previous section describes how the surplus generated from an acquisition depends both on
the synergies it creates and on the nancial position of the target rm. However, besides gen-
erating a positive surplus, an acquisition also has to be feasible. This depends on the acquirer’s
nancial position.
Financially Constrained Acquirer. Acquirers with low realizations of yj are potentially con-
strained. Like their targets, they face borrowing constraints, which reduces their ability to per-
form acquisitions. As a consequence, some acquisitions that would generate a positive surplus
do not take place because the acquirer himself lacks the liquidity to nance the acquisition.
Since the acquirer as well as the target are nancially constrained, we need to consider both of
their borrowing constraints and keep track of both of their expected net prots post-acquisition,
which are yj and φi,jyi, respectively. Generally, the borrowing constraint for the post-acquisition
entity states that total upfront costs, 2b, cannot exceed some value 2τB(φi,jyi, yj):
b ≤ τB(φi,jyi, yj). (2.5)
Here, the functionB, together with τ , determines this upper limit, which we assume to positively
depend on both the acquirer’s prots, yj , and the target’s post-acquisition prots, φi,jyi. Assum-
ing that this function is invertible in φi,jyi, it is convenient to denote the minimum values for φi,j
and yi that satisfy this borrowing constraint as φi,j(yi, yj) and yi(φi,j, yj). We also refer to this
joint borrowing constraint as a feasibility constraint in the context of an acquisition.
The impact of this feasibility constraint on acquisitions is illustrated in Figure 2. In addition
to the synergy cut-os that characterize the set of points where acquisitions are protable (for a
given yj , the area bounded below by ABCF ′ in Figure 2), there is now an additional downward
sloping curve XX ′ describing the joint borrowing constraint of the target rm and the acquirer.
XX ′ shows the minimum target’s expected prots, y
i
, for each φi,j (or the minimum synergy
level φ
i,j
at each level of yi) that makes acquisitions feasible, given an acquirer’s expected prots,
yj , and aggregate nancial conditions, τ . For a given φi,j of a match, only acquisitions to the
right of XX ′ can potentially take place, even if they are protable, because the acquirer himself
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faces nancial constraints. The negative slope of theXX ′ can be understood as follows. Because
low φi,j acquisitions have lower expected prots, the feasibility constraint is tighter for these
acquisitions. These acquisitions therefore need larger target rm expected prots, yi, to make
them feasible. The acquirer’s expected prots, yj , and aggregate nancial conditions, τ , act as
“shifters” for the XX ′ curve. For acquirers with higher expected prots yj , the curve XX ′ shifts
down and lowers the cut-o value of the synergy parameter φi,j . For high enough yj the curve
XX ′ crosses point A, so that the impact of the acquirer’s nancial constraint is no longer felt. A
higher τ has an analogous eect on XX ′.
Figure 2 illustrates that the feasibility constraint restricts the mass of both low- and high-
value acquisitions that a constrained acquirer can actually complete upon being matched with a
target. For an acquisition by a constrained rm to take place, the following two conditions have
to be met: i) it generates positive surplus, i.e., φi,j ≥ φhi for productive targets
(
yi ≥ τb
)
, and
φlo ≤ φi,j < φhi for less productive targets
(
yi <
τ
b
)
and ii) both rms together have enough
resources to pay for their upfront costs, which can be expressed using the feasibility constraint
as yi(φi,j, yj) ≥ yi. Based on these conditions, the mass of low- and high-value acquisitions are
nlo ≡
∫ φhi
φlo
∫ ∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,yi)
dGidGjdF and nhi ≡
∫
φhi
∫ ∫
y
i
dGidGjdF, (2.6)
where F , Gj and Gi denote the distributions of φi,j , yj and yi.
Limiting Case: Unconstrained Acquirer. When an acquirer’s prots tend towards innity,
yj → ∞, he does not face any borrowing constraints (as long as τ > 0), so that acquisitions are
always feasible and take place whenever they generate a positive surplus, i.e. whenever S ≥ 0.
For this set of unconstrained acquirers, denoted by an asterisk, the mass of low- and high-value
acquisitions are
nlo
∗ ≡
∫ φhi
φlo
∫ b
τ
dGidF and nhi
∗ ≡
∫
φhi
dF. (2.7)
In Figure 2, these sets of acquisitions correspond to the area above ABCF ′.
2.2 Financial Crises and the Average Acquired Share
In this section, we ask whether an aggregate nancial shock to the economy, modeled as a de-
crease in τ from τn to τc, aects the average ownership structures observed in the market for
corporate control. We start by dening these average acquired shares. For constrained rms, it
is denoted by αˆ and can be expressed as the weighted sum of the average shares of low- and
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high-value acquisitions, αˆlo = αlo
nlo
and αˆhi = αhi
nhi
, with the weights being the share of these two
types of acquisitions in the total number of unconstrained acquisitions:
αˆ = ωαˆlo + (1− ω)αˆhi (2.8)
where ω = nlo
nlo+nhi
, and equivalently for the average share αˆ∗ acquired by unconstrained rms.12.
Before proceeding further, we make an assumption about the relationship between owner-
ship structures and the synergies parameter. In particular we assume that the share acquired
αi,j is increasing in the synergy parameter φi,j associated with the acquirer-target pair (i, j), i.e.,
α′(φi,j) > 0. We remain agnostic about the reasons for this positive relationship. It could be that
rms acquire larger shares of targets in expectation of stronger technological synergies, or that
larger acquisition shares lead to strong synergies, or both. Both of these forces would arise in
contracting models of joint ventures (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001) or acquisitions (Alquist et al.,
2018) when owners co-invest in inputs. Such a relationship could also arise due to majority con-
trol facilitating the transfer of intangible assets as in the large literature in international trade on
rm boundaries (see Antràs, 2003; Antràs, Desai and Foley, 2009), or due to non-technological
reasons when controlling stakes resolve agency issues in target rms as in Acharya, Shin and
Yorulmazer (2011b). Thus, while synergies arising endogenously in the model could be an in-
teresting extension, it would dilute the focus of the analysis, which is on selection eects. The
assumption is also natural in the context of EMEs, where Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) nd that
acquisitions of majority (≥ 50%) stakes are associated with positive abnormal returns of 1.16%,
on average. Our assumption implies that low-value acquisitions (φlo ≤ φi,j < φhi) feature lower
acquired shares than high-value acquisitions (φi,j ≥ φhi).
We now ask how an aggregate nancial shock dierentially aects the share acquired by con-
strained rms. α, compared to the share acquired by unconstrained rms, α∗. Focusing on the
dierential lets us capture how nancial constraints of the acquiring rms shape the aggregate
eect of the shock. Since the shock aects both acquirers and targets in reality, the dierencing
cancels out the component of the shock that works through the nancial constraints of targets
alone. Specically, we look at the derivative ∂(αˆ−αˆ
∗)
∂τ
, where τ is the parameter governing aggre-
gate nancial conditions. Our later empirical test of the model follows this analysis closely, using
a dierence-in-dierence strategy.
12The average shares for low- and high-value acquisitions by constrained acquirers are given by:
αˆlo =
αlo
nlo
=
∫ φhi
φlo
∫ ∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,yi)
αi,jdGidGjdF∫ φhi
φlo
∫ ∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,yi)
dGidGjdF
and αˆhi = α
hi
nhi
=
∫
φhi
∫ ∫
min( bτ ,yi)
αi,jdGidGjdF∫
φhi
∫ ∫
min( bτ ,yi)
dGidGjdF
.
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To gain insight into the derivative ∂(αˆ−αˆ
∗)
∂τ
, it is useful to decompose the above derivative using
the expressions for αˆ and αˆ∗ as follows:
∂ (αˆ− αˆ∗)
∂τ
=
[(
αˆhi
∗ − αˆlo∗)− (αˆhi − αˆlo)] ∂ω
∂τ︸︷︷︸
=?
+
(
αˆhi
∗ − αˆlo∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂ω∗
∂τ︸︷︷︸
<0
− ∂ω
∂τ︸︷︷︸
=?

+
[
ω
∂αˆlo
∂τ
+ (1− ω)∂αˆ
hi
∂τ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=?
−
[
ω∗
∂αˆlo
∗
∂τ
+ (1− ω∗)∂αˆ
hi∗
∂τ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
(2.9)
While the signs of some of the individual components depend on specic assumptions regarding
the distribution of expected prots,G, and the joint borrowing constraint,Bi,j , the decomposition
above is quite general. The rst row refers to changes in the share of low-value acquisitions,
∂ω/∂τ and ∂ω∗/∂τ , also called the extensive margin. The second row, the intensive margin,
refers to the changes in the average acquired share for each subgroup of low- and high-value
acquisitions.
The extensive margin diers substantively for constrained and unconstrained acquirers: For
unconstrained acquirers, the negative nancial shock increases the share ω∗ of low-value acqui-
sitions (region BCDE in Figure 2, that is ∂ω∗/∂τ < 0) as a larger proportion of potential target
rms nd themselves unable to raise enough external debt nancing to cover the upfront cost
of operating in the second period, and thus face liquidation. Coupled with our assumption that
α′(φi,j) > 0, this implies a decline in the average share coming from this channel. For constrained
acquirers, this eect is counterbalanced by a second eect: A nancial shock also tightens the
joint borrowing constraint, shifting the φi,j = φ(yi, yj, τ) line up from XX ′ to Y Y ′ (see Figure
2) and making it harder for rms to acquire targets. This dampens the increase in the share of
low-value acquisitions because some low-value acquisitions cannot take place as acquirers nd
themselves unable to raise sucient funds. Importantly, this shift in the joint-borrowing con-
straint can, under certain conditions, disproportionately aect low-value acquisitions. Borrowing
constraints skew the distribution of acquired rms further towards acquisitions with higher syn-
ergies. Some low-synergy acquisitions that might still be protable, suddenly become infeasible
if neither the target nor the acquirer has enough liquidity. This aggregate extensive margin for
constrained acquirers depends on the distribution of expected prots in the economy, G, as well
as the precise form of the joint borrowing constraint, Bi,j .
The intensive margin does not react to the aggregate shock in the case of unconstrained
acquirers. Since the mass and composition of their high-value acquisitions are unaected by the
nancial crisis, the average acquired share within that group does not change, i.e., ∂αˆhi
∗
∂τ
= 0. The
crisis leads to an increase in the mass of low-value acquisitions, but this increase is independent of
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φi,j , so that the average acquired share of low-value acquisitions remains constant, i.e., ∂αˆ
lo∗
∂τ
= 0.
For constrained acquirers, the sign and magnitude of the intensive margin depends on which
rms are aected more by the shift of the borrowing constraint, i.e., on G and Bi,j .
Hence to pin down the extensive and intensive margins for constrained acquirers, we make
further assumptions regarding G and Bi,j . We assume that G is Pareto, and that Bi,j is multi-
plicative in the expected prots of both acquirer and target. We specify and discuss these assump-
tions extensively in the appendix. In the following proposition we analytically prove that under
these assumptions the acquired share of constrained rms, relative to that of unconstrained rms,
should rise in response to an aggregate tightening of nancial constraints.
Proposition 1 Increase in relative acquired shares of constrained rms during crises
Under Assumptions 1 through 3 (listed in the appendix), the shares acquired by constrained rms
relative to the shares acquired by unconstrained rms become larger during nancial crises, i.e. if
τc < τn then αˆc − αˆ∗c > αˆn − αˆ∗n.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
Under our assumptions for G and Bi,j , the magnitude of the two counteracting extensive
margin eects for constrained acquirers described earlier — the increase in the potential pool
of low-value acquisitions and the decrease in the feasibility to complete low-value acquisitions
— perfectly cancel each other out, so that the share of low-value acquisitions, ω, remains un-
aected by the change in the constraint parameter τ . Similarly, the intensive margin for con-
strained acquirers does not move, due again to the Pareto distribution assumption: Even though
the lowest-value acquisitions are hit hardest among low-value acquisitions by the shift of the
borrowing constraint, their relative mass does not go down, keeping the average acquired share
of low-value acquisitions constant. Thus under our particular assumptions, the decrease in the
average acquired share comes purely from a change in the composition of acquisitions (extensive
margin) for unconstrained acquirers rather than any changes in the average acquired share of
low-value acquisitions and high-value acquisitions (intensive margin).
As we emphasized, whether the share acquired by constrained rms remains exactly constant
eventually depends on the rm prot distributionG and the joint-borrowing constraintBi,j . The
key of this section was to provide intuition about the two counteracting forces that determine
the observable average ownership structure chosen for constrained acquirers, and to delineate the
assumptions under which we can assign an unambiguous sign to their net eect. In a later section
we simulate the model numerically under alternative assumptions onG andBi,j and nd that the
decrease in the feasibility to complete low-value acquisitions might even dominate the increase in
the low-value target pool, and as a result, the average share by constrained acquiring rms even
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goes up in the aftermath of an aggregate nancial shock. Thus, we will use the decomposition
provided by equation (2.9) and Proposition 1 as a simple benchmark case to guide and interpret
our empirical implementation later.
2.3 Three-Period Model Setup
The analysis so far has been static. To study the eect of a nancial shock on the dynamics of
ownership, we now allow for the possible resale of rms after an acquisition. We show that the
selection eects based on technological synergies and liquidity that inuenced average ownership
structures might also inuence post-acquisition ownership dynamics. In particular, we show that
in the presence of asset sales driven by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to the owner of the asset, an
aggregate nancial shock leads to the selection of liquid acquirers into the market for corporate
control, thereby lowering asset ownership turnover. In this section we briey outline the steps
used to solve the dynamic (three-period) version of the model and provide intuition behind the
main results. Detailed statements and proofs of the underlying propositions are relegated to the
appendix.
We extend the model in the previous section by an additional period, period 2. When we later
analyze the eects of nancial crises on divestiture rates, we model period 1 as a crisis period
with tighter borrowing constraints and period 2 as a “normal” period, where nancial conditions
have returned to their previous state. At the end of period 1 the acquirer j receives an all-or-
nothing oer for her entire share of the rm that was purchased in period 0. We make two main
assumptions to simplify the analysis substantially: (i) every prospective seller in period 1 can nd
a new acquirer to buy back his initial period 0 acquisition, and similarly, every target rm that
was not acquired in period 0 can nd a new acquirer in period 1; and (ii) the new acquirer making
the buy-back oer operates the rm using the same technology as the original owner of the rm
(i.e. φi,j = 1). These two assumptions together allow for a simple diagrammatic analysis of the
resale decision.13 In the static model, acquisitions occurred simply on the basis of protability and
feasibility. However, since resale of the asset involves comparing the payo from the resale to the
payo from retaining ownership of the asset, we need additional assumptions on the division of
13The assumption that every target rm that was not acquired in period 0 can nd a new acquirer implies that
the outside options for target rm and acquirer at the end of period 1 are the same and therefore do not aect the
surplus of the initial acquisition. This assumption together with the assumption that the new acquirer has φi,j = 1
keeps the relevant acquisition cutos φlo and φhi the same as in the static model. One can relax the assumption
that sellers nd a buyer with certainty. Reducing this probability is similar to introducing a discount factor. This
being said, it is true that these assumptions are less innocuous if we believe that parameters are changing over the
business cycle. For example, the probability of nding a buyer or the potential outside oer can change over the
business cycle. These extensions might give use additional insights on ipping behavior, but we believe that they
are orthogonal to the mechanism discussed in this section. Note that we no longer require the assumption that the
acquired share α positively depends on the synergy parameter φi,j .
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the surplus from an acquisition as well as the stochastic process of protability in periods 1 and
2. These latter assumptions — Nash bargaining between acquirers and targets over surplus and
an autoregressive process for prots — are relatively standard and are discussed in the appendix.
In period 1, it is optimal for the initial acquirer j to resell the rm i whenever the value of
reselling exceeds the value of holding onto the rm. The resale value depends on the expected
net prots from production in period 2 for the new acquirer who makes the oer to buy. The
value of holding onto the rm depends on the expected liquidity position of the post-acquisition
entity (i.e. the acquirer-target entity resulting from the period 0 acquisition), since this entity will
become nancially constrained at the end of period 1 with some probability, and thus be unable
to produce.
Combining the period 1 resale decision with the initial period 0 acquisition decision, we obtain
ve cases, illustrated in Figure 3. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, no initial acquisition takes place
in cases 1 and 3 because synergies are too low.14 Initial acquisitions — some of which will be
resold — take place in the remaining cases. Resales happen under two circumstances. First, all
initial acquisitions that were driven by pure liquidity provision (low-value acquisitions) get resold
because the target rm no longer requires liquidity for production in period 2. These “normal
ips” happen if φi,j < φhi (case 2 in Figure 3).
Second, even some high-synergy acquisitions with φi,j ≥ φhi might get ipped (cases 4 and
5). This happens whenever the post-acquisition entity becomes liquidity-constrained at the end
of period 1. The probability of this “forced ipping” coincides with the probability of the post-
acquisition entity not having enough liquidity, conditional on having had enough liquidity in the
rst period. Since unconstrained acquirers have enough liquidity by denition, forced ipping is
only relevant for constrained acquirers.
We dene ipping, or divestiture, rates are as the number of acquisitions ipped at the end of
period 1, nflip, over the number of total acquisitions made at the end of period 0, n. Unconstrained
acquirers only ip low-value acquisitions (normal ips), so that their ipping rate is simply
nflip
∗
n∗
=
nlo
∗
nlo∗ + nhi∗
= ω∗︸︷︷︸
normal
,
where ω∗ is the share of low-value acquisitions. Constrained acquirers might, in addition, be
forced to ip some of their high-value acquisitions:
nflip
n
=
nlo + (1− p)nhi
nlo + nhi
=
nlo
nlo + nhi
+
(1− p)nhi
nlo + nhi
= ω︸︷︷︸
normal
+ (1− p)(1− ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
forced
, (2.10)
14In case 1, the target rm exits the market because it lacks liquidity to pay for the upfront cost of production; in
case 3, the target rm has enough liquidity to produce by itself, but the synergies are too low to justify an acquisition.
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Figure 3: Resale of Acquired Firms
Notes: Figure displays combinations of the synergy parameter φi,j and the expected prots yi,1
of a target rm, which can be initially acquired and then resold (’ipping’). The joint borrowing
constraint φ
i,j
is drawn for a constrained acquirer with a given liquidity level yj,1. See text and
appendix for further details on the dierent cases.
where p is the share of high-value post-acquisition entities that have enough liquidity at the end
of period 1 (out of the total mass of high-value post-acquisition entities). The mass of asset resales
for constrained acquirers is thus made up of a mass ω of normal ips and a mass (1− p)(1− ω)
of forced ips.
2.4 Financial Crises and Asset Resales
We now ask how nancial crises aect these ipping rates by considering two scenarios. In
scenario 1, all periods are normal periods with τ1 = τ2 = τn. In scenario 2, the nancial crisis
occurs at the end of period 0, but is over by the end of period 1, i.e. τ1 = τc < τ2 = τn. As
with the acquired share, we focus on the dierential eect on constrained acquirers relative to
unconstrained acquirers to capture any change in divestiture rates that work through the nancial
constraints of the acquiring rm alone.
Proposition 2 Decrease in relative flipping rates for acquisitions made by constrained
acquirers during crises
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Under Assumptions 2 through 4 (listed in the appendix), ipping rates of acquisitions made by
constrained rms relative to those made by unconstrained rms become smaller for acquisitions
made during nancial crises, i.e. if τc < τn then n
flip
c
nc
− nflip
∗
c
n∗c
< n
flip
n
nn
− nflip
∗
n
n∗n
.
To understand the intuition behind this result, it is instructive to look at the derivative, with
respect to τ1, of the dierential ipping rate:
∂
(
nflip
n
− nflip∗
n∗
)
∂τ1
=
∂ω
∂τ1︸︷︷︸
=0
+
∂
∂τ1
(1− p)(1− ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− ∂ω
∗
∂τ1︸︷︷︸
<0
> 0. (2.11)
We examine each of the terms on the right hand side of the expression above in turn. The
last term is the response of the divestiture rate of unconstrained rms to a negative nancial
shock in the economy. Since unconstrained rms only ip low-value acquisitions, the change in
the proportion of ipped unconstrained acquisitions is simply equal to the change in the share
of low-value acquisitions in all acquisitions by unconstrained acquirers. This, as shown earlier,
increases (i.e. ∂ω∗
∂τ1
< 0) when there is an adverse aggregate nancial shock (i.e. decline in τ1) due
to more potential target rms requiring liquidity.
The rst two terms show the response of constrained rms and suggest two dierences rel-
ative to the case with unconstrained acquirers: The rst term shows the changes in the share of
low-value acquisitions that get ipped. A main insight from Proposition 1 in Section 2.2 was that
this share of low-value acquisitions does not change for constrained acquirers during crises due
to two counterbalancing eects. This keeps ipping rates low.15
The second term refers to changes in the number of “forced” resales caused by acquirers
running into liquidity problems. As emphasized in Section 2.2, only rms with large expected
prots can raise sucient funds to undertake acquisitions during nancial crises. To the extent
that rms’ expected prots are somewhat persistent, it is less likely that these rms will face
liquidity problems in the aftermath of the nancial crisis, which will reduce the ipping rates for
acquisitions made by constrained acquirers during nancial crises.16
The lower ipping rates observed for crisis-cohort acquisitions are therefore the result of a
double “selection eect” stemming from the acquirer’s side: Only the highest-synergy acquisi-
tions (i.e. large φi,j) take place, and only the most-liquid rms (i.e. large yj,1) acquire targets. In
the following empirical section, we directly test Proposition 2 using a dierence-in-dierence ap-
15As before, this is a knife-edge result that rests on the distributional assumptions we made. In the next section
we will attempt an empirical assessment of the size of this eect.
16More formally, ∂p/∂τ1|τ2 < 0: Given a borrowing constraint level in the second period, τ2, a tighter borrowing
constraint in the rst period (τ1 ↓) raises the probability that the post-acquisition entity has enough liquidity at the
end of the second period, p. Importantly, it is the increase of τ from a low crisis value τ1 = τc to a high value τ2 = τn
that raises this probability p.
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proach. In addition, since the proposition holds only under particular distributional assumptions,
we also attempt to empirically determine the signs and magnitudes of the three terms discussed
above.
3 Model Versus Data
In this section we compare the predictions of the model with the data by simulating the model
in Section 3.2 to obtain shares acquired and divestiture rates, and then comparing these to their
empirical counterpart in Section 3.3.
3.1 Data Description
We take the model to the data using transaction level data for domestic and cross-border M&As
from the Thompson-Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum database, as well as control vari-
ables from a number of sources. SDC contains information on the universe of M&A transactions
in a large set of EMEs. We only include sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control
in EMEs that had signicant activity in the M&A market over the entire sample period: Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Singapore,
South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Even though our full sample (for
which we displayed some key patterns in the introduction) goes from 1990-2014, we exclude the
post-2007 period since the Great Recession because foreign rms from developed markets might
have been nancially constrained post-2007. Robustness checks with the longer series, reported
in an appendix, leave our main conclusions unchanged.17 For each transaction, we utilize a few
key variables: the share of a rm acquired in an acquisition and owned after an acquisition, the
names of the rms involved, both their primary two-digit SIC industry classications, the country
of the acquirer and target rm, and the date on which the transaction was completed.
We also use macroeconomic controls in all our regressions. Real GDP growth (annual) is used
to proxy for normal business cycle variation in M&A activity (Brown and Dinc, 2011) and real
GDP per capita (annual) to control for the level of development of the target country (Erel, Liao
and Weisbach, 2012). Nominal exchange rate depreciation (quarterly) is included to control for
the eect of exchange rates on the value of collateral (Froot, 1991) and the use of IMF credit and
17We further limit our sample in a few ways. We only use transactions in which 10% or more of a rm is ac-
quired. This is done to keep our results comparable to the literature on FDI, since, as explained below we use foreign
acquisitions as a comparison group. Since we rely on cross-border acquisitions in EMEs as a comparison group of
unconstrained acquirers, we exclude cross-border acquisitions made by rms from our target countries in other EME
target countries, for example, a Malaysian cross-border acquisition in Thailand. Our results are not sensitive to in-
cluding these transactions partly since the vast majority of foreign acquiring rms in our sample are from developed
markets. These selection procedure leaves us with a sample of 28,109 transactions.
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loans as a percentage of a country’s quota (quarterly) to account for stress factors in the balance
of payments.18 Summary statistics are provided in the appendix (Table B.1).
3.2 Simulating the Model
We simulate the model to analyze the reaction of the average acquired share and ipping rates to a
tightening of the borrowing constraint. We rst have to choose functional forms and parameters.
Some of these parameters are chosen to match certain features of the data on emerging market
acquisitions described above. Here, we only briey discuss some key parameters and refer the
reader to the appendix for a more detailed discussion.
For the joint borrowing constraint, we assume that banks consider acquirer’s and target’s
expected prots as perfect substitutes:
2b ≤ τ (φi,jyi + yj) .
We choose τn = 0.75 during normal times and τc = 0.6, translating into a 25 percent decline in
the maximum debt-to-value ratio. As we will see, the simulation results hold for a wide range of
values for τn and τc, at least qualitatively. For the distribution of expected prots, yi and yj , we
choose a log-normal distribution (instead of the Pareto distribution assumed earlier). We assume
that the distribution of synergies, φi,j , is normally distributed with mean 1, meaning that half
the rm pairs draw synergy parameters that lower the net productivity of the target rm. We
assume a constant elasticity between the synergy parameter and the acquired share, α, in the
range where α ∈ [0; 1]. This elasticity, together with the standard deviation of the distribution
of φi,j are calibrated to roughly match the share of acquisitions below 50%, the fraction of full
acquisitions, and the average acquired share that we observe in the data.
3.2.1 Simulated Average Acquired Shares
Figure 4(a) shows how the average acquired share of both unconstrained and constrained ac-
quirers adjusts to a steady decline of the maximum debt-to-value ratio, τ , in our 2-period model
from Section 2.2. During normal times the average acquired share is somewhat higher among
constrained rms (0.76 vs. 0.68). As credit constraints tighten, we observe that this gap widens
by almost 7 percentage points, in line with Proposition 1. This widening is driven both by a de-
crease of the average acquired share for unconstrained acquisitions (by 4 percentage points) and
an increase for constrained acquirers (by almost 3 percentage points). Recall that under the spe-
18These variables are introduced in single-period lags, following Brown and Dinc (2011). The sources of these
data are the Penn World Tables, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Taiwan’s National Statistical Oce, and
the Central Bank of the Republic of China.
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cic assumptions underlying Proposition 1, the average acquired share for constrained acquirers
stays constant instead of going up. Its precise movement particularly depends on the range of τ
and the form of the joint borrowing constraint, and even though the share might even go down
for constrained acquirers, we never found a combination of parameters for which it went down
more than it did for unconstrained acquirers.
Figure 4(b) decomposes this overall change in the dierence of the average acquired shares
across acquirers into the extensive and intensive margins, following equation (2.9). It shows the
result of this decomposition for a change in τ from 0.75 to 0.6, both for the net eect (constrained
less unconstrained), and for unconstrained and constrained acquirers individually. The net in-
crease in the gap of 7% stems to two thirds from the extensive margin. This strong extensive
margin is mainly driven by unconstrained acquirers. For acquisitions undertaken by constrained
acquirers, this composition eect actually ips. Most of the increase in the average acquired share
stems for an increase within each type of acquisitions.
3.2.2 Simulated Flipping Rates
An additional parameter of our three-period model, that we did not need in the two-period cal-
ibration discussed in Section 3.2, is the persistence of the temporary productivity, ρ. There is
little guidance in the literature on this parameter, but it is probably uncontroversial to assume
some persistence. We set ρ = 0.5, which, if we think of one period in our model corresponding
to roughly four years, is in line with an annual persistence of about 0.85. Note that our results
remain robust even for ρ = 0.
Figure 4(c) displays ipping rates for both constrained and unconstrained acquirers as a func-
tion of the borrowing constraint parameter in the crisis, τ1. After the crisis, τ returns to its normal
value of τ2 = 0.75. For the chosen parameters, ipping rates increase for unconstrained acquirers
by 6 percentage points from 11.5 to 17.2 percent, but decrease for constrained acquirers from 18.5
to 16.3 percent.
3.3 Regression Analysis of Average Acquired Share and Flipping Rates
To provide empirical evidence on the acquirer nancial constraint channel, we now adopt the
same dierence-in-dierence (DID) strategy that formed the basis of Propositions 1 and 2 in the
model section.
3.3.1 Average Acquired Share: Empirical Strategy, Hypotheses and Results
Following Proposition 1 we rst estimate the magnitude of the dierential eect of the crisis on
ownership shares acquired by domestic and foreign acquiring rms. For easy interpretability of
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(a) Average Acquired Share
(b) Decomposition of a Change in the Average Acquired
Share
(c) Share of Flipped Acquisitions
Figure 4: Simulation Results
Note: Panel (a) shows the simulated average acquired share of rms as a function of the borrowing constraint
parameter τ . A nancial crisis is modeled as a decrease of τ . Panel (b) decomposes the percentage change
from τ = 0.75 to τ = 0.6 into a composition change, the extensive margin, and a change in the average ac-
quired share of both low-value acquisitions and technology acquisitions using the following equation: ∆αˆ −
∆αˆ∗ =
(
αˆlo − αˆhi)∆ω − (αˆlo∗ − αˆhi∗)∆ω∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ext
+ω′∆αˆlo + (1− ω′)∆αˆhi −
(
ω∗
′
∆αˆlo
∗
+ (1− ω∗′)∆αˆhi∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Int
,
where a prime ′ denotes the value after the change. Panel (c) shows the simulated share of ipped acquisitions
as a function of the borrowing constraint parameter τ .
24
the coecients we use a simple OLS specication as our baseline specication. Results using a
Generalized Linear Model (to take into account the bounded nature of our dependent variables)
are similar and can be found in the appendix. We rst estimate the parameters of the following
equation to nd the overall or total eect of the crisis on ownership shares:
fracacqkjct = β
Tot.
0 + β
Tot.
C D
ct
C + β
Tot.
F D
kjct
F + β
Tot.
C,F D
ct
C ×DkjctF + con
′
βcon + kjct. (3.1)
The dependent variable in this regression, fracacqkjct, is the fraction of the target rm acquired
in a transaction (“fraction acquired”). The subscripts k, j, c, and t stand for transaction, single-
digit SIC industry of the target rm, target country, and time, respectively. The two main in-
dependent variables are DctC , which indicates whether an acquisition took place during a period
when there was an aggregate adverse nancial shock in the target country (“Crisis”), and DkjctF ,
which indicates whether the acquirer involved in a particular transaction is from a developed
market (“Foreign”), which proxies for unconstrained acquirers in our theoretical model. Our
crisis dummy DctC is dened using the (annual) systemic banking crises dates from Laeven and
Valencia (2010). The vector con of independent variables used as controls includes xed eects
(at the country×target-industry level in our baseline specications) and a set of lagged country-
level macroeconomic variables, varying at the country×year level. The motivation behind these
control variables are discussed at length later. Briey, the xed eects control for time invariant
factors at the country×target-industry level (for example, that particular industries in particular
countries might have unique ownership structures due to regulations), while the macroeconomic
variables correct for normal business cycle variation in M&A activity. Since our main explanatory
variables are binary, the baseline group in the above regression, as well as all subsequent ones,
is identied by setting DctC = 0 and D
kjct
F = 0, simultaneously, which is the subset of domestic
acquisitions during normal times.
Next, we decompose the total eect into an extensive and an intensive margin, as in the
theoretical model. For identifying the extensive margin empirically, we estimate the following
regression:
Dkjctmaj. = β
Ext.
0 + β
Ext.
C D
ct
C + β
Ext.
F D
kjct
F + β
Ext.
C,F D
ct
C ×DkjctF
+ con
′
βcon + kjct,
(3.2)
where the dependent variable is a dummy Dkjctmaj. that takes a value of 1 above some threshold of
ownership (“majority”). Recall that the extensive margin in the model (see Proposition 1) refers
to changes in the shares of low-value acquisitions (∂ω/∂τ and ∂ω∗/∂τ for constrained and un-
constrained acquirers, respectively). Furthermore, we argued earlier — based on the empirical
ndings of Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) and Alquist et al. (2018) — that changes in ω and ω∗
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should translate into changes in average ownership structures. Thus the empirical counterpart
of extensive margin changes in ownership structure is a compositional shift towards majority
(Chari, Ouimet and Tesar, 2010) or full acquisitions (Alquist et al., 2018). In our baseline estima-
tions, we set the threshold of ownership beyond which acquisitions are high-value in EMEs to be
50% based on Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010).
To estimate the intensive margin, we use a specication identical to equation 3.1 in all re-
spects, except that we include a dummy independent variable identifying a majority acquisition:
fracacqkjct = β
Int.
0 + β
Int.
C D
ct
C + β
Int.
F D
kjct
F + β
Int.
C,FD
ct
C ×DkjctF
+ βmaj.D
kjct
maj. + con
′
βcon + kjct.
(3.3)
The idea behind this specication is that part of the marginal eects on acquired shares captured
in the parameter estimates of equation 3.1 might be driven by changes in the prevalence of ma-
jority acquisitions (i.e. the extensive margin) during crises. This part of the eect is captured by
the “majority” dummy Dmaj . The coecient βInt.C,F then captures the remaining eect, that is the
eect driven by changes within the group of non-majority (1%-49%) acquisitions and within the
group of majority acquisitions (50%-100%).
Based on Proposition 1 and the earlier discussion, we frame a key empirical hypothesis re-
garding the coecients associated with the dummy variable interactionsDctC×DkjctF in equations
3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Hypothesis 1 Financial crises have dierential eects on ownership structures chosen by domestic
and foreign acquirers. Specically, crises should have a larger eect on domestic stakes in comparison
to foreign stakes during crisis times, i.e., βTot.C,F < 0. This is driven by both extensive and intensive
margins, i.e., βExt.C,F < 0 and β
Int.
C,F < 0.
The crisis eect for domestic acquisitions is βC and those for foreign acquisition is βC +βC,F .
We expect the crisis eect to dier for domestic and foreign acquisitions, since the latter are
presumably unaected by local credit conditions. In particular, we expect the crisis eect to
be larger for domestic acquisitions, i.e., βC + βC,F − βC = βC,F < 0. This, in turn, is driven
by changes along an extensive margin (relative decline in the share of high-value acquisitions
for foreign acquirers), and an intensive margin (relative decline in stakes acquired within the
category of low and high value acquisitions for foreign acquirers).
We estimate the three regressions (equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) by OLS, using our EME data
(Panel A of Table 1) and using simulated data from the theoretical model (Panel B of Table 1).
Columns (1)-(3) of both panels of Table 1 correspond, respectively, to equations 3.1 - 3.3, and
form our baseline results. The column headings indicate which of the margins described above
(“Tot.” for Total, “Ext.” for Extensive and “Int.” for Intensive) the coecients correspond to.
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Table 1: Decomposition of Ownership Stake Changes During Crises
Baseline Results Robustness Check
(Majority Acquisitions) (Full Acquisitions)
Panel A: SDC Data
Tot. Ext. (50%) Int. (50%) Ext. (100%) Int. (100%)
Crisis (βC) 0.05a 0.06a 0.01c 0.05a 0.02a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Foreign (βF ) -0.01 0.00 -0.01a -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Crisis × Foreign (βC,F ) -0.07a -0.09a -0.02b -0.10a -0.02b
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Majority (β50%) 0.62a
(0.00)
Full (β100%) 0.59a
(0.00)
No. obs. 28,019 28,019 28,019 28,019 28,019
R2 0.08 0.06 0.76 0.08 0.73
Panel B: Simulated Data
Tot. Ext. (50%) Int. (50%) Ext. (100%) Int. (100%)
Crisis (βC) 0.03a 0.01a 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign (βF ) -0.11a -0.14a -0.01a -0.08a -0.07a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Crisis × Foreign (βC,F ) -0.07a -0.06a -0.03a -0.06a -0.04a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Majority (β50%) 0.69a
(0.00)
Full (β100%) 0.51a
(0.00)
No. obs. 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000 300,000
R2 0.04 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.66
Notes: The table reports the point estimate of the coecient associated with the banking crisis dummy βC , foreign acquisition dummy βF
and their interaction βC,F obtained from an OLS estimation on the SDC dataset (Panel A) and simulated data (Panel B). For both panels, the
precise specications in columns 1-3 are as follows. Column (1) corresponds to equation 3.1; column (2) corresponds to equation 3.2; column (3)
corresponds to equation 3.3. Column (4) is an alternative of the specication in column (2) with the dependent variable dened on the basis of a
dummy variable that is 1 when 100% of a rm is acquired in an acquisition. Column (5) estimates the specication in column (1) on the subset
of acquisitions in which less than 100% of a rm is acquired. Conceptually, it is a counterpart of the specication in column (3). See the text of
the paper for detailed explanations. a, b and c indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. All columns in Panel A have macroeconomic controls and country×target-industry xed eects, the coecients of which
are omitted from the table to conserve space.
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First, in qualitative terms, note from Panel A that we nd strong empirical support for our key
hypothesis: We nd in column 1 that the crisis eect is larger for domestic acquisitions than
foreign ones (βTot.C,F < 0, Hypothesis 1). We nd in columns 2 and 3 that the estimates for the
extensive margin (−0.09) and the intensive margin (−0.02) are both of the correct sign and
statistically signicant (at the 1% and 5% level, respectively).
The estimated eects are also large quantitatively. During normal times, both domestic and
foreign rms acquire on average about a 65% share in their targets, while roughly 65% of their
acquisitions comprise majority acquisitions in which at least 50% of a target is acquired. Starting
from no statistically signicant dierences during normal times (as indicated by the zero coe-
cients on DF in column 1 of Panel A) there is a divergence in the share acquired by 7 percentage
points (pp.), driven by an increase of about 5 pp. (signicant at 1%) for domestic acquirers and a
2 pp. decline (signicant at 5%, calculation not shown) for foreign acquirers. Stated dierently,
domestic and foreign rms acquire roughly similar shares during normal times, while domestic
rms acquire about 11% more ownership during banking crises. The divergence in the likelihood
of completing majority acquisitions is even larger, about 15%.19 Columns 1-3 together suggest
that the mechanisms highlighted by our theoretical analysis — that of an extensive margin com-
positional shift towards high-value majority acquisitions (βExt.C,F in column 2) and a selection eect
along the intensive margin (βInt.C,F in column 3) — are signicant determinants of the divergence in
ownership between constrained domestic acquiring rms and unconstrained foreign rms cap-
tured by βTot.C,F in column 1.
Note that in Table 1, the DID crisis eects, which compares the crisis eect on constrained
(domestic) acquirers to the crisis eect on unconstrained (foreign) acquirers, are 7 pp., 9 pp. and
2 pp. for the total eect, the extensive margin and the intensive margin, respectively. In compar-
ison, the coecients βTot.C = 0.05, βExt.C = 0.06 and βInt.C = 0.01 in Panel A of Table 1, which
only compare domestic rms between crisis and normal times, are smaller in magnitude. Thus,
not taking into account the eects of the change in the pool of target rms during nancial crises
— which in our estimates is captured by the comparison to a baseline of unconstrained foreign
acquirers — underestimates the eect that acquirer-side nancial constraints have on ownership
shares.
To compare the model’s predictions to the empirical results in quantitative terms, we present
in Panel B of Table 1 the coecients from identical estimations performed on a data set with a
total of 300,000 observations simulated using the procedure outlined in the previous section. For
19It should be noted that these baseline estimates form a lower bound in that they control for macroeconomic
conditions and xed eects. Table B.2 in the appendix, which is discussed later, shows the results without these
controls. According to these estimates, while domestic and foreign rms acquire roughly similar shares during
normal times, domestic rms acquire about 15% more ownership during banking crises and are about 18% more
likely to complete majority acquisitions.
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completeness we report the same set of statistics in Panels A and B, such as the number of ob-
servations and standard errors. However we focus only on the point estimates of the coecients
from the simulated data.20 Looking at column 1, Panel B, we see that the simulated crisis leads to
an increase of the share acquired by domestic acquisitions of 3 percentage points, but a decrease
for foreign acquisitions by 4 percentage points, implying again a gap of 7 pp., as in the data. Note
that these numbers are consistent with the simulation results conveyed in Figure 4. The predicted
signs and magnitudes of the coecients are remarkably similar in the simulated and actual data
for such a parsimonious model.21 Decomposing the eect into an extensive and intensive margin
(columns 2 and 3), we nd that the intensive margin plays a somewhat more important role in
the simulated data than the actual data.22
A cut-o ownership of 50% denes high-value acquisitions in our baseline regression results
reported in columns 1-3, based on the results of Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010). We also report
results for an alternative where the cut-o ownership for high-value acquisitions is 100%, that
takes into account the industry-level positive correlation between target productivity and the
likelihood of 100% acquisitions reported in Alquist et al. (2018). Accordingly, we re-estimate an
alternative of the specication in column 2 with the dependent variable being an indicator that
is 1 when 100% of a rm is acquired in an acquisition (column 4 of Panels A and B). Correspond-
ing intensive margins are shown in column 5 using the specication in column 3, but using an
indicator variable for 100% acquisitions (instead of ≥ 50% acquisitions as in column 3). Overall,
both denitions of high-value acquisitions yield similar results. Our empirical analysis of divesti-
ture decisions utilizes this alternative denition of a high-value acquisition for reasons that are
claried in the following section.
20The point estimates are eectively the coecients from a linear approximation of the data generating process
implied by the theoretical model, and are meant to provide a sense of the quantitative performance of the model. We
do not have data that would let us precisely calibrate all the stochastic processes used in the simulations, for example,
the variance of rm-specic idiosyncratic shocks. Since these inuence all the objects estimated in the regression
with the simulated data, we do not compare all the estimated statistics, e.g. standard errors, to the corresponding
statistics from the SDC regressions.
21One caveat to this particular comparison between the model and the data is that we do not calibrate our nancial
friction parameter τ , but simply model the aggregate nancial shock as a decline in τ from 0.75 to 0.6, resulting in a
25 percent decline in the maximum debt-to-value ratio of all rms. Both the initial value of τ and its drop determine
the DID coecient βC,F , as can be seen in Figure 4a. It is, however, remarkable that both the data and the model
suggest that this DID eect is driven to roughly the same extent by an increase in the share acquired by domestic
rms and a decrease in the share acquired by foreign rms.
22The reader might notice that the magnitude of the coecient associated with the foreign dummy βF is clearly
negative, in contrast to a near zero coecient in the data. Our model therefore implies that foreign acquisitions are
somewhat smaller than domestic acquisitions during normal times. This is not too surprising because our model
assumes that foreign and domestic acquirers only dier in their access to nance. Low-synergy (and hence, small-
share) acquisitions are not feasible for domestic, constrained acquirers in our model, even in normal times. One could
easily align the model’s predicted βF with that found in the data by assuming that foreign and domestic acquirers
also vary along other dimensions, such as in the distribution of synergy parameters. This modication, however,
would have little eect on the model’s predictions about our main coecient of interest, βC,F .
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3.3.2 Divestiture Rates: Empirical Strategy, Hypotheses and Results
Our model also has predictions on the subsequent resale of acquisitions. To remind the reader,
Proposition 2 looked at the dierential eect of a nancial shock on the divestiture rates of con-
strained domestic and unconstrained foreign acquisitions. The motivation for focussing on the
dierential is the same as that for the acquired share, which is that a DID procedure is better able
to isolate the eects of acquirer nancial constraints. In particular, Proposition 2 predicted that
the dierential ip rate (“constrained” minus “unconstrained”) would decline. To test Proposition
2 empirically, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model of the following form:
ln[hkjc(τ |·)] = ln[hjc(τ)] + βCDctC + βFDkjctF + βC,FDctC ×DkjctF
+ controls
′
c,t−4βmc + kjct.
(3.4)
where DctC , D
kjct
F and the controls are dened as in the previous section. The estimated hazard
function, hjc(τ), is the probability density that the average rm experiences an acquisition event
in a small interval of time ∆τ , conditional on it not having been the target of an acquisition for
τ units of time since the last acquisition event (see Kalbeisch and Prentice, 1980, for details of
the notation). We stratify this baseline hazard hjc(τ) at the country×target-industry level (i.e.,
allowed to be dierent across countries indexed c and industries indexed j), to be consistent
with the country×target-industry xed eects in the regression analysis of acquired shares. The
purpose of the stratication is to take into account divestiture patterns that might be unique to
certain countries and industries, say due to regulations.
For our baseline estimations, the duration τ of an acquisition is measured as follows. We iden-
tify target rms that appear at least twice in our data. Let such a target rm be indexed by k. The
rst transaction involving k identies the beginning of the relationship between the rst acquirer
and the target. The second transaction involving k is assumed to mark the end of the immediately
preceding ownership relationship, and so on for subsequent appearances by the same target k
in the data.23 The duration of acquisitions involving target k is then dened as the distance in
time between each transaction involving k. While this scheme has the serious limitation that an
acquisition event involving k always assumes the seller of the stake to be the previous acquiring
rm (which may not be the case due to partial ownership), it has two advantages. First, it lets
us keep the same sample of rms for which we estimated our ownership regressions. Second, it
makes the performance of the theoretical model easier to compare to the data for reasons that are
explained later. However, we show in the appendix that an alternative way of dening duration
that is immune to the issue described above leaves our conclusions unchanged.
In the model above, the hazard ratio hkjc(τ |X)
hjc(τ)
is the ratio between the hazard rate when the
23Our data does not allow us to identify the direct seller of a share in a transaction.
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covariates take values summarized by the vectorX , and the baseline hazard. Our main hypothesis
from Proposition 2 is that the crisis eect should lead to a relative decline of ipping rates of the
crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions, or a relative increase in the ipping rates of foreign cohort.
That is, the coecient βC,F in 3.4 should be positive.
Hypothesis 2 Financial crises have dierential eects on ip rates of the crisis cohort of domestic
and foreign acquisitions. Specically, the dierential ip rate for the crisis cohort of domestic ac-
quisitions will decline, i.e., βC,F > 0. Equivalently, the exponentiated coecient, which shows the
dierential eect in percentage terms should be greater than unity, i.e., eβC,F > 1.
The results of estimating equation 3.4 are shown in column 1 of Table 2. For ease of exposition
the table displays the exponent of the coecient, e.g. eβC,F instead of βC,F .24 Values above one
then indicate an increase in the hazard rate, and values below one indicate a decrease in the
hazard.
We nd evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2: The point estimate of the hazard ratio correspond-
ing to the coecient eβC,F is 1.31, signicant at 5%. This implies that the eect of the crisis on the
ipping rates of the crisis cohorts of domestic and foreign acquisitions are statistically dierent,
in the direction predicted by the theory. The subsequent ip rate for foreign acquisitions under-
taken during crises goes up by
(
eβC,F − 1) × 100 = 31% compared to the ip rate for domestic
acquisitions.
To better understand this empirical result we turn again to Proposition 2, which decomposed
the dierential eect of the crisis in ipping rates as follows,
∆
(nflip
n
− n
flip∗
n∗
)
= ∆ω︸︷︷︸
∆ normal flip (=0)
+ ∆(1− p)(1− ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ forced flip (<0)
− ∆ω∗︸︷︷︸
∆ normal flip (>0)
< 0, (3.5)
into changes of the “normal” and “forced” ip rates for domestic acquirers, and the change in the
“normal” ip rate for foreign acquirers. Proposition 2 predicted that there is no change in the
proportion of normal ips for domestic acquirers (since there is no change in the proportion of
low-value domestic acquisitions) under particular assumptions about the distribution of synergies
and nancial liquidity. At the same time it predicted that the dierential (foreign - domestic) ip
rate would increase, driven by the decline of domestic forced ips and the increase of foreign
normal ips. Note that the signs assigned above to the terms are based on ∆τ1 < 0.
First, we establish whether the behavior of domestic or foreign ips drives the empirical evi-
dence in favor of Proposition 2. In terms of the Cox regression hazard ratios in Table 2, a decline
24See Table B.10 in the appendix that displays the regression coecients associated with the hazard ratios in Table
2.
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Table 2: Hazard Ratios From Cox Model
Baseline Results1 Robustness Checks
(Majority Acquisitions)2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis (eβC ) 0.81b 0.84c Crisis (eβC ) 0.76c 0.78b
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Foreign (eβF ) 0.90 0.85b Foreign (eβF ) 0.82b 0.86c
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Crisis×Foreign (eβC,F ) 1.31b 1.19 Crisis×Foreign (eβC,F ) 1.12 1.06
(0.16) (0.14) (0.22) (0.19)
Majority (eβ50%) 0.23a Full (eβ100%) 0.17a
(0.01) (0.01)
No. obs. 28,019 28,019 No. obs. 19,329 19,329
Log L -20,336.8 -19,414.8 Log L -7,117.0 -6,630.9
Notes: 1 Baseline results for the estimated hazard ratios associated with the banking crisis dummy
DC , foreign acquisition dummy DF , a dummy for 50% acquisitions D50%, and their interaction terms
obtained from a Cox duration model.
2 Robustness results replacing D50% with dummy for 100% acquisitions D100%. Columns (3) and (4)
are based on the sample of acquisitions by domestic and foreign acquirers in which at least 51% is acquired.
Columns (1) and (3) correspond to regression equation 3.4, and columns (2) and (4) to equation 3.6, expo-
nentiated to express them in terms of hazard ratios. The baseline hazards are stratied by country×target-
industry. The dates for the domestic banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia (2010). a, b and c indicate
statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the level
of country×target-industry are reported in parentheses. All columns include macroeconomic controls
whose coecient estimates are omitted from the table to conserve space.
in the ip rate of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions would imply a corresponding haz-
ard ratio of eβC < 1, and an increase in the ip rate of the crisis cohort of foreign acquisitions
would imply eβC+βC,F > 1. Column 1 of Table 2 shows that eβC = 0.81, statistically signi-
cant at the 5% level, meaning that the subsequent ip rates of domestic acquisitions are lower by
(1− eβC )× 100 = 19% when conducted during crises. At the same time eβC+βC,F = 1.06, which
suggests that the ip rate for foreign acquisitions do increase as predicted by the theory. But the
change is small, about (1− eβC+βC,F )× 100 = 6%, and not statistically signicant.25 Hence, we
conclude that the empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 2 is driven mostly by a decline in the
average ip rates of the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions.
25To test statistically whether eβC+βC,F is dierent from 1, we conduct a test of signicance for the linear com-
bination of coecients in the Cox regression. We nd that the point estimate of βC + βC,F is 0.06 with a standard
error of 0.09, so that eβC+βC,F ≈ 1.06.
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Figure 5: Estimated share of ipped acquisitions from Cox regression
Notes: The gure displays the cumulative proportion of ipped acqui-
sitions with respect to the time after acquisition based on the estimated
coecients of the stratied Cox proportional hazards model in Col-
umn (1) of Table 2. The adjusted baseline cumulative hazard function,
corresponding to the curve for domestic acquisitions in normal times,
is obtained from a weighted average of the baseline hazard functions
across target country×industry strata, with the weights proportional
to the number of ipped acquisitions at the given level of stratum.
The estimated hazard ratios in Table 2 are informative about the magnitudes of the eects of
the individual covariates in comparison to the baseline hazards, but do not tell us anything about
the actual ip rates. For further comparison to the theoretical model, Figure 5 therefore plots
the cumulative proportion of acquisitions ipped predicted from the Cox estimation above as a
function of the number years since the acquisition. The four lines on the gure correspond to the
four categories of acquisitions that are of interest: domestic-normal (DN), domestic-crisis (DC),
foreign-normal (FN) and foreign-crisis (FC). The empirical estimates indicate that the ip rates of
the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions are lower at all horizons (the cumulative ip cure shifts
down from DN to DC), while the ip rates of the crisis cohort of foreign acquisitions are higher
at all horizons (the cumulative ip cure shifts up from FN to FC).
Recall that Figure 3 in the simulation section displayed ipping rates for constrained and
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unconstrained acquirers as a function of the borrowing constraint parameter, τ . The crisis was
modelled as a change in this parameter from 0.75 to 0.6, and then reversion to its normal value of
0.75 after the crisis. For the chosen parameters, the simulations of the model predicted an increase
of the ipping rates for unconstrained acquirers by 6 percentage points from 11.5% to 17.2%, and a
decrease for constrained acquirers from 18.5% to 16.3%, both over a period of roughly 4 years since
the date of the acquisition. In contrast, the empirical results show that the percentage of foreign
acquisitions ipped at the 4-year horizon increases from 10.2% to 10.9% for the normal versus the
crisis cohort (16.3% to 17.4% for a 10-year horizon), while the same gure for domestic acquisitions
declines from 11.4% to 9.3% for the normal versus the crisis cohort (18.2% to 14.8% for a 10-year
horizon). Comparing the magnitudes of the cumulative fractions of acquisitions ipped in Figures
5 and 3, three points stand out. First, the theoretical model overestimates the levels of the ip rates
at the 4-year horizon for which the model is calibrated. Second, the theory underestimates the
change in the ip rates of domestic (constrained) acquisitions and overestimates the change in
the ip rates of foreign (unconstrained) acquisitions. Third, the magnitude of the changes in the
ip rates predicted by the model are more consistent with empirical ip rates at longer horizons.
Next, we ask whether it is changes in normal ips or changes in forced ips that drive the 19%
decline in domestic divestiture rates found in column 1. From the decomposition in equation 3.5,
it can be seen that lower ipping for constrained domestic acquirers can be in principle due to
fewer normal ips driven by a compositional shift towards high-value acquisitions (though under
the distributional assumptions in Proposition 2 this change is 0), as well as fewer liquidity-based
forced ips. We attempt to disentangle these two channels by using a majority acquisition as
the empirical counterpart for a high-value acquisition, as in our baseline estimates for ownership
acquired.26 The idea is to control in regression 3.4 for the compositional shift towards high-
value acquisitions. If our estimate of the hazard ratio eβC remains unaected by this control, we
interpret this as evidence that part of the reducing ipping rate is driven by fewer forced ips.
Accordingly, we add to the model of equation 3.4 a dummy independent variableDkjct50% indicating
whether a transaction resulted in majority ownership:
ln[hkjc(τ |·)] = ln[hjc(τ)] + βCDctC + βFDkjctF + βC,FDctC ×DkjctF
+ β50%D
kjct
50% + controls
′
c,t−4βmc + kjct.
(3.6)
The results of estimating equation 3.6 are shown in column 2 of Table 2. We nd evidence that
the decline in the ipping rate for domestic acquirers is driven by both a decline in forced ips
and a decline in normal ips. First, though the hazard ratio eβC in column 2 declines somewhat
in magnitude (indicating a 16% decline in domestic ip rates, as opposed to 19% in column 1),
26As explained earlier, this builds on the idea in Chari, Ouimet and Tesar (2010) that majority acquisitions create
real value gains in emerging markets for both domestic and foreign acquirers.
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it remains statistically signicant at 10%. Thus, to the extent that the full ownership dummy
proxies for high-value acquisitions, controlling for the compositional shift towards high value
acquisition keeps our qualitative results unchanged. Through the lens of our theoretical model,
we interpret this result as evidence that there are fewer liquidity-based forced ips for the crisis
cohort of domestic acquisitions. Second, part of the decline in the ipping rates can be explained
by a compositional shift. The highly statistically signicant hazard ratio associated with Dkjct50%
in column 2 shows that majority acquisitions indeed have lower divestiture rates (77% lower
on average), consistent with the behavior of high-value acquisitions in the model. This result,
coupled with our earlier nding that there is an extensive margin shift towards full acquisitions
for domestic acquirers (column 4 of Table 1), suggests that part of the lower divestiture rate
identied in column 1 of Table 2 is driven by the rst channel in the model, which is, a decline
in normal ips due to a shift towards high-value acquisitions that are less likely to be divested.
Thus, we nd evidence that both channels in equation 3.5 lead to a decline in ips in the cohort
of domestic crisis-time acquisitions.27 Estimating equation 3.6 with additional interaction terms
of the independent variables leaves our conclusions unchanged (see Table B.12 in the appendix).
The duration τ of an acquisition in the baseline regressions was measured by the distance
in time between each transaction involving a particular target rm. However, this potentially
overestimates change in the ipping rates because partial ownership stakes may be ipped by a
dierent owner than the one involved in the initial transaction. Thus, as a robustness check, we
only use the subsample of acquisitions in which the acquiring rm owned 51% or more of the
target post-acquisition in the hazard estimation.28 We proxy for high value acquisitions with full
acquisitions instead of majority acquisitions in this case. The results of this alternative estimation
are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. The results are consistent across the two denitions of
duration. In fact the point estimates of the hazard ratios show a somewhat larger decline of 24%
in the hazard rates of domestic ips.
To summarize our empirical results, we nd strong empirical support for our predictions re-
27The magnitudes of the hazard ratios eβF in the second row of Table 2, columns 1 and 2 (0.90 and 0.85, respec-
tively), are also consistent with the predictions of our model. They indicate that foreign acquisitions completed in
normal times have lower divestiture rates than domestic ones, as shown in Figure 3.
28Along with the fraction of a target acquired in a transaction, our data source provides the fraction of the target
that the acquiring rm owns after the transaction. These may be dierent when the acquirer had prior partial
ownership in the target. For the purpose of the robustness check, we rst limit our sample to acquisitions in which
post-acquisition, the acquiring rm owned 51% or more of the target. We then identify target rms that appear at
least twice in our data. Let such a target rm be indexed by k. In the second acquisition involving k, it has to be
the rst acquirer who sold a stake in the target since we limited the sample to acquisitions after which the acquirer
owns at least 51% (since the sum of ownership shares cannot exceed 100%). The initial transaction thus identies
the beginning of the relationship between the rst acquirer and the target. The second sale is assumed to mark the
end of the immediately preceding ownership relationship, and so on for subsequent appearances by the same target
in the data. The duration of acquisitions involving target k is thus the distance in time between each transaction
involving k that resulted in a stake of at least 51%.
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garding the fraction of a rm acquired. Specically, we nd that nancially constrained domestic
rms in the crisis-hit country acquire between 11-15% more ownership and are 15-18% more likely
to take majority stakes than their unconstrained foreign counterparts (see our earlier calculations
based on columns 1 and 2 in Panel A of Tables 1 and B.2). Such ownership is also more likely to
be persistent: the survival rate of a domestic acquisition is between 19-24% higher in the crisis
cohort (from the exponentiated coecient eβC in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2). Thus the evidence
on divestiture rates is also consistent with our theoretical predictions, though statistically weaker
for certain specications, and generally favors the mechanisms highlighted by the model.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
We nd that all our empirical results are robust to a large number of checks. In the interest of
space these are simply listed here, while a detailed discussion can be found in the accompany-
ing appendix. The robustness checks include: (i) extending the estimation sample up until 2014;
(ii) alternative banking crisis dates from Reinhart and Rogo (2009) instead of our baseline dates
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010), or using only the sample of countries which had crises; (iii) the in-
clusion of macroeconomic variables to control for normal business cycle variation in acquisition
activity; (iv) additional controls for alterative explanations that might drive dierences between
domestic and cross-border acquisitions (for example, those in Froot, 1991) or Zhu, Jog and Otchere
(2011); (v) dierent xed eects combinations to control for sector (see Acharya, Shin and Yorul-
mazer, 2008, for example, with respect to nancial M&As) or country dierences; (vi) changes in
sectoral shares of M&A activity during crises; and (vii) non-linear estimation procedures such as
the Generalized Linear Model.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper provides a simple analytical framework for assessing the acquirer-side eects of ad-
verse aggregate nancial shocks on the market for corporate control. We model two kinds of
acquiring rms: those operating under nancial constraints similar to target rms, and those
that are nancially unconstrained. We derive two hypotheses stating that nancial crises have
opposite eects on the acquisition behavior of these two groups: Acquisitions undertaken dur-
ing nancial crises feature smaller shares and are shorter lived for unconstrained acquirers, but
are characterized by larger shares and are more persistent for constrained acquirers. Intuitively,
nancial crises induce a selection eect among constrained acquirers with only the acquisitions
with the highest synergies being successful, and the most liquid rms acquiring rms completing
these acquisitions. Interpreting constrained and unconstrained acquiring rms as domestic and
foreign acquirers in a large dataset of emerging market acquisitions spanning the years 1990-2007,
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we provide robust evidence of an increase in the relative stakes acquired in domestic acquisitions,
as well as a relatively lower divestiture rates domestic acquisitions in the crisis cohort, as pre-
dicted by the model.
Two elements of our theoretical analysis are worth highlighting. First, we focus entirely on se-
lection eects based on synergies and nancial liquidity. While simple and intuitively appealing,
our analysis shows that the precise direction and magnitude of such eects depend on considera-
tions such as the distributions of synergies and productivity. The selection eect identied in the
model is a general point, which we then use to explain the specic dierences between domes-
tic and cross-border acquisitions that we note in the introduction, and then robustly establish in
our empirical analysis. Selection based on nancial liquidity of acquirers forms the basis of our
ipping results. An additional assumption about the relationship between ownership structures
and synergies, which would arise in many models of input provision (Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001;
Alquist et al., 2018), intangible assets (Antràs, 2003; Antràs, Desai and Foley, 2009), or agency
issues (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2011b), and has strong empirical support in EMEs (Chari,
Ouimet and Tesar, 2010), forms the logical bridge between selection eects based on transaction
synergies and ownership structures. Our theoretical analysis thus points to one possible explana-
tion for the empirical facts about emerging market M&As. We control for a number of competing
hypotheses about dierences between domestic and foreign acquirers in our robustness analysis,
such as strategic market entry by foreign acquirers versus consolidation by domestic acquirers;
particular sectoral characteristics such as for nancial rms, or changes in sectoral composition
of acquisitions during crises. Our results survive these checks.
We would like to emphasize in this context that mechanisms other than selection eects may
also be at work, but would either have diculty matching the observed dierences between do-
mestic and cross-border acquisitions on their own, or are silent about the evolution of ownership
structures and divestiture rates. For example, neo-classical theories of M&As in the tradition of
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) would suggest that optimal pairings would occur between rms
that dier in terms of their Tobin’s Q. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) in fact nd that oer price/book
value of domestic target rms collapsed during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, suggesting a role
for matches between relatively high Q foreign (or domestic) rms and undervalued targets.29
However, it is not clear why in this case domestic acquirers would acquire relatively more own-
ership, and be less likely to divest these acquisitions later (controlling for these higher stakes). An
appealing feature of our analysis is that it is based on a very general aggregate selection eect.
In fact, a key implication of our results is that even if acquisition and divestiture decisions at the
rm level remain unaected by nancial disruptions, we might see salient aggregate eects due
to selection.
29Oer price/market value remained stable. See Figure 5 in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005).
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Second, our contrasting results for constrained (domestic) and unconstrained (foreign) acqui-
sitions highlight the role of rm level borrowing constraints for rm acquisitions, which in our
model comprise the only dierence between rms, in determining which nancially constrained
rms remain active in the market for corporate control. It should be noted that this is a deliberate
modelling choice, and done to demonstrate the eect we are after — the dierence in the behavior
of foreign and domestic rms when the latter are faced by nancial shocks — most cleanly. Thus
our results have mostly focussed on the comparative statics of a nancial shock rather than the
initial level dierences in the variables of interest (such as shares acquired and divestiture rates),
which could be due to dierences in technology between foreign and domestic rms that are ex-
plicitly excluded in the model. It is therefore not surprising that our model empirically performs
much better in explaining crisis-induced changes in acquired shares and divestiture rather than
their levels.
Our model has important macro-economic implications that are worth exploring further. For
example, the selection eects described in this paper have direct consequences for an economy’s
aggregate productivity. Since Joseph Schumpeter’s classic work (Schumpeter, 1934), it is well
understood that recessions or nancial crises lead to higher average productivity through a so-
called “cleansing” eect that forces the exit of the least productive rms. Our model suggests
that such a cleansing eect might also be present in the market for corporate control, where it
shifts resources towards the most productive M&As. Since these M&As are also shown to be
longer lived, these eects are likely to endure beyond the nancial crisis itself. A careful analysis
of these eects requires a dynamic model and is beyond the scope of this paper, but we already
point towards selection eects that are likely to be critical in such a model.
The model also has a rich set of rm-level predictions regarding the joint distribution of pro-
ductivity and nancial liquidity for acquirers and targets that we do not test partly because, to
the best of our knowledge, high-quality balance sheet data for a large set of acquirers and target
rms do not exist in the case of EMEs (since, for example, many transactions involve privately- or
family-owned rms) for most years. Using rm level balance-sheet data from select EMEs, years
and rms to explore these predictions is a fruitful direction for future work. Also, while applied
to the data in the context of EMEs, the model in this paper is equally applicable to acquisitions in
developed markets, for which better quality and more extensive rm-level data exist, and where
nancial liquidity has also been shown to be important for the M&A process (e.g., Harford, 1999;
Almeida, Campello and Hackbarth, 2011; Erel, Jang and Weisbach, 2014). The model can thus help
guide future empirical work on the role of productivity and nancial constraints in the market
for corporate control. These and other investigations are left for future work.
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